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Case No. 8206

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CQ:UNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corporation, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing
business as Wright-Wirthlin Company, JOHN 0.
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corporation; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L.
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty
Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation;
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION. OF UTAH, a Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING CORPORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; SHAW
INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., a corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA
SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK,
doing business as the Brockbank Realty and
Construction Company; GEORGE H. SMEATH,
MARY H. SMEATH, and J. K. THAYN,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESP·ONDENT
SALT LAKE CITY
Appealed from Third District Court of Salt Lake County,
HON. CLARENCE E. BAKER, Judge
.E. ··J{,. CHRISTENSEN,
. ) _City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN and
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN
Assistant City Attorneys
. Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
S.alt Lake City
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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IN THE. SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., a corporation, ALMA H. COTTAM, MEEKS WIRTHLIN
and ADRIAN WRIGHT, a partnership, doing
business as vVright-Wirthlin Company, JO·HN 0.
SPECK, McDONALD BROS., INC., a corporation; JOSEPH McDONALD; and KEITH L.
KNIGHT, doing business as Knight Realty
Company,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs.SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation;
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT OF
SALT LAKE CITY, a body politic; the PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH, a Commission of Utah; ALEXANDER BUILDING CORPORATION OF UTAH, a corporation; SHAW
INC., a corporation; SOUTHEAST INC., a corporation; SALT LAKE COUNTY CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, a body politic; BERTHA
SHEPHERD; BERNARD P. BROCKBANK,
doing business as the Brockbank Realty and
Construction Company; GEORGE H. SMEATH,
MARY I-I. SMEATH, and J. K. THAYN,

Case No.
8206

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND R.ESP·ONDENT
SALT LAKE CITY
STATEMENT OF CASE
The plaintiffs filed a petition in the lower court for
a delaratory judgment. By their petition plaintiffs
sought to have Salt Lake City declared a public utility
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and subject to the Public Utilities Act in the sale and
distribution of its surplus water to consumers outside
its territorial limits, and particularly within the limits
of an area as to which the plaintiff, County Water System, had secured a Certificate of Convenience and Necessity from the Public Service Commission to distribute
culinary water. The essential provisions of the petition
are set out in plaintiffs' Brief so that an attempt on our
part to state these provisions would be mere repetition.
The defendant Salt Lake City, together with other of the
defendants, filed a Motion to Dismiss based upon the
ground that the petition did not state a claim which would
entitle the plaintiffs to any relief. The matter was argued before the lower court, briefs were submitted and
the Motion of the defendant was granted.
We shall attempt to answer each of the points relied
on by plaintiffs in their brief in the order in which they
there app-ear. The points relied upon by defendant Salt
Lake City constitute the reverse of the points made by
the plaintiffs and are as follows:

POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMrnSING
THE PETITION HEREIN.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
CO·NSTRUE THE P'ROVISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 and 28, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY WATER WITHIN THE AR.EA
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED
HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT COMMISSION AND ONLY TO THE PLAINTIFF
COUNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., OR OTHER PUBLIC
UTILITY.

POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY IS
WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR
OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF
WATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE
DISTRIBUTION O·F WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL CO·URT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT IS
ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION
OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE
LIMITS.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION HEREIN.

It seems. to be the plaintiff's position, under their
F'irst Point that notwithstanding it appears as a matter

'

of law that Salt Lake City, in the disposition of its surSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plus water, is not subject to the control of the Public
Service c·ornmission, the court nevertheless, should not
have dismissed the action, but should have gone on
through the process of a trial even though no different
result would or could be reached. In effect their argument is that a Motion to Dismiss can never be invoked in
an action for declaratory relief. Further, it appears to be
their contention that a dismissal is not proper even as to
parties against whom no relief is asked and as to whon1
no cause of action is stated. They argue, by analogy to
quiet title actions, that the only way such defendants
could be relieved from the action is by filing a disclaimer, and then they would, nevertheless, be bound by
the judgment that might be entered.
While plaintiffs' position as to the defendants
against who1n no relief is asked, and as to whom no cause
of action is stated, may not affect defendant Salt Lake
City in this ap·peal, we deem it advisable, nonetheless,
to point out that th.ere is no analogy between a quiet title
action and the present action. First of all, in a quiet title
action a cause of action must be alleged. Plaintiff may
not allege merely that <Iefendants claim some ownership
or right in the property in question, but must allege ownership and a right of possession in himself as against all
named defendants. He cannot merely allege that defendants claim an interest in the property involved and by
that 1neager p-rocess deny the defendants the right to
have the action dismissed for want of stating a cause of
action or comp.el them to eome in and file a disclaimer.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In the quiet title action, the plaintiff must show that he
is entitled to relief as against the defendants by a proper
allegation of ownership in himself. In the absence of
such allegations, his complaint has no efficacy as against
a motion to dismiss. Likewise in this case where there
can be no control as a. matter of law by the Public Service
Co1nmission over the disposition of the City's surplus
"\Vater, as the trial court must have held, there is nothing
to sustain the action against any of the defendants.
vVhether the trial court erred in so holding is another
1natter which vvill he discussed later in this brief.
It is conceded by plaintiffs that .an action for a declaratory judgrnent is subject to the same procedural
rules and principles as those applicable to civil cases generally. Section 78-38-9, U.C.A., 1953, provides that:
"vVhen a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, such
issue may be tried and deterrnined in the same
manner as issues of fact are tried and determined
in other civil actions in the court in which the
proceeding is pending."
Obviously, if only questions of law are involved, since
by Motion to Dismiss the essential facts are admitted,
the matter is to be disposed of in the same manner as
other civil actions generally. So far as ·Salt Lake City is
concerned, our theory, in making the Motion to Dismiss,
is that, admitting the facts to be as stated in the petition, the court could only declare that under the constitutional and statutory provision, and under the law anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nounced by the court, the defendant City has the power
to sell water outside its territorial limits and that in
doing so it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission. If that theory is correct then that
would end the matter and any further hearings or proceedings would be useless. The trial court evi:dently
agreed with the City's theor.y and so properly dismissed
the petition.
Having disn1issed as to the City, there 'vas no issue
left to be tried as to the other defendants, assuming
they had an interest in the subject matter of the action.
There would be no rights to declare as between plaintiffs and the defen:dants or either of them.

POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN FAILING TO
CO·NSTRUE THE PRO·VISIONS OF U.C.A. 1953, 54-2-1, SUBDIVISIONS 3, 26 and 28, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE DEFENDANT, SALT LAKE CITY, IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY
TO SELL OR DELIVER ANY WATER WITHIN THE AREA
DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE PETITION FILED
HEREIN EXCEPT WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE DEFENDANT CO·MMISSION AND O·NLY TO THE PLAINTIFF
CO·UNTY WATER SYSTEM, INC., OR OTHER PUBLIC
UTILITY.

The question as to the right of the City to dispose
of its surplus water outside its territorial limits without
being subject to control by the Public Service Conunission
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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will be discussed in another part of this brief. Under this
heading we wish to point out that this court is commit.ted
to the following propositions :
(a) The City is not a public utility under the provisions of the Public Utili ties Act.
(b) The City, in the absence of statute, has the
right to dispose of its surplus water outside
its territorial limits.
(a) Logan City v. Public
m~ission,

Util~ties

Com72 Ut. 536, 271 P. 961.

This case involved the right of the Public Utility Commission to fix the rates to be charged by Logan City in
furnishing electricity from its municipally owned and
operated electric power plants. The city solicited custoIners in competition with the Utah Power & Light Company and the commission ordered the city to charge the
same rates charged by the Power & Light Company and
annulled all contracts as to rates between the City and
its customers.
Two members of the Supreme Court held that regardless of the definitions of public utility contained
in the statute a power plant owned and operated by the
city "was not intended to be a public utility within the
meaning of the utilities act, giving the commission supervision, direction and control over such municipal corporate affairs and functions."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Two members held the utilities act if -construed to
include a municipally owned and operated plant as a public utility subject to control and regulation by the Utility
Commission it would be unconstitutional under the provision of Sec. 29, Art. 6 of Utah Constitution. "We think
it clear that the undoubted p~urpose of the constitutional
provision is to hold inviolate the right of local selfgovernment of cities and towns with respect to municipal
improvements, money, p·roperty, effects, the levying of
taxes, and the performance of municipal functions."

State Tax Commission v. Cvty of Logan, SS
Ut. 406, 54 P. 2d 1197.
The case of Logan City v. Public Utility Com.mission,
supra, was referred to to the effect that the Public Utility
Com. was without jurisdiction to fix rates to be charged
for electricity generated by a municipally owned and
operated power plant.
In Lehi v. Barnes, 74 Ut. 321, 279 P. 878, the court
held the city did not need a certificate of convenience
and necessity to enlarge its business and selling electrical
energy to its inhabitants.

Utah

Pow~er

& Light Co. v. Pu-blic Servvce Commis-

s~on,

__ U t. ------, 249 P. 2d 951. The Public Service Commission had or:dered the plaintiff to sell at wholesale electric energy to Nephi City, 'vhich in turn sold it to its
inhabitants, where plaintiff company held itself out as
giving such service to municipalities and where, by servSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing Nephi, it would not be required to make any expenditures it would not have to 1nake for any customer entitled to its services. The court sustained the order. It
says:
"In accordance with. the holding of this court
in Logan City v. Public Utilities Commission, 72
Ut. 536, 271 P. 961, the Commission found that
public utilities operated by municipalities are not
subject to supervision and regulation by the Public Utilities Commission."

Childs v. Columbia, 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296, 34
L.R.A.N.S. 542. The court held the authority granted to
a 1nunicipal corporation to operate a water works system
does not impose upon it the duty of a public service corporation with respect to non residents to whom it eontracts to furnish water. It can fix such rates as the City
council deems to the best interest of the city.
The foregoing Utah cases all involved distributing
and selling electrical energy. The only statutory enactment empowering cities to engage in such undertaking
is Section 10-8-14, U.C.A. 1953. As to the matter of the
city engaging in obtaining, regulating and controlling a
vvater supply for its inhabitants, the Legislature has
granted extensive and additional povvers to those contained in Section 10-8-14. We think it important that
these statutes be considered in the determination of the
question whether a City is subject to the Public Service
Commission in operating and maintaining a water system
whether the water is sold vvithin or without its territorial
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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limits. They show the legislative intent to leave "inviolate right of local self-government of cities and towns
with respect to municipal improvements, money, property, effects, the levying of taxes, and the performance
of municipal funetions." This is especially true as to
water, as the statutes, by their express language, grant
to the cities extensive and detailed powers with respect
thereto. The Legislature has given to the city such full,
absolute and exclusive control of its water, waterworks
and the distribution of its water, and over the regulations
and rates which will govern its water service such that
regulation in anyway by any other body or commission
is absolutely negatived. The effect of such statutes must
be to withhold jurisdiction from the Public Service Commission as effectively as if the Public Utilities Act contained an express exemption, especially so when most
of said sections were enacted at the same session as the
Public Utilities Act. Section 10-8-14 must be construed
and considered in the light of such exclusive control.
The power there given is a necessary concomitant of the
power to own water rights and op,erate a waterworks
system, for no City could exist and grow if it did not pro. .
vide for its future needs and have water available in excess of its actual present needs. We assert, therefore,
that ail of the sections above referred must be considered
and are involved in the disposition of the matter before
the court. F!or the convenience of the court ·\Ve quote
these statutes:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sec. 10-7-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 :

"Limitations on right to acquire a.nd disp:ose
of. - It shall not be lawful for any city or town
to lease or purchase any part of such waterworks
less than the whole, or to lease the same, unless
the contract therefor shall provide that the city
or town shall have control thereof and that the
net revenues therefrom shall be divided proportionately to the interests of the parties thereto ;
said contract shall also provide a list of water
rates to be enforced during the term of such contract."
Sec. 10-7-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953:

"Water rates - Owner of prem.ises liable. No city or town which is the owner or in control
of a system for furnishing water to its inhabitants
shall be required to furnish water for use in any
house, tenement, apartment, building, place, premises or lot, whether such water is for the use of
the owner or tenant, unless the application for
water shall be made in writing, signed by such
owner or his duly authorized agent, in which application such owner shall agree that he will pay
for all water furnished such house, tenement,
apartment, building, place, premises or lot according to the ordinances, rules and regulations enacted or adopted by such city or town. In case an
application for furnishing water shall be made by
a tenant of the owner, such city or town may require as a condition of granting the same that
such application contain an agreement signed by
the owner thereof, or his duly authorized agent,
to the effect that in consideration of the granting
of such application the owner will pay for all
water furnished such tenant, or any other occuSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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p,ant of the placed named in the application, in
case such tenant or occupant shall fail to pay for
the same according to the ordinances, rules and
regulations enacted or adopted by such city or
town."
Sec. 10-7-11.

"Failure to pay for service- Termination. In
case the owner of any of the premises mentioned
in section 10-7-10, or the tenant or occupant, shall
fail to pay for water furnished such owner, tenant
or occupant, according to such ordinances, rules
or regulations enacted or adopted, the city or
town may cause the water to be shut off from such
premises, and shall not be required to turn the
same on again until all arrears for water furnished shall be paid in full."
Sec. 10-7-12.

"Scarcity of water -

Limitation on use. -

In the event of scarcity of water the mayor of any
city or the president of the board of trustees of
any town may, by proclamation, limit the use of
water for any purpose other than don1estic purposes to such extent as may be required for the
public good in the judgment of the board of commissioners or city council of any city or the board
of trustees of any town."
Sec. 10-7-14.

"Rules and regulations for use of water. Every city and town may enact ordinances, rules
and regulations for the 1nanage1nent and conduct
of the waterworks system owned or controlled by
1t "
0

0
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Sec. 10-8-2.

"Appropr·iations - Acquisition and d.isposal
of property. They may appropriate money for
corporate purposes only, and provide for payment
of debts and expenses of the corporation; 1nay
purchase, receive, hold, s'ell, lease, convey and dispose of property, real and personal, for the benefit of the city, both within and without its corporate boundaries, improve and protect such property, and may do all other things in relation thereto as natural persons; provided, that it shall be
deemed a corporate purpose to appropriate money
for any purpose "\vhich in the judgment of the
board of commissioners or city council will provide for the safety, preserve the health, promote
the prosperity and improve the morals, peace,
order, comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
of the city.
"'
Sec. 10-8-14.

"Water, light, telephone, street ra.ilways Providing service beyond limits of city. - They
may construct, maintain and operate waterworks,
gas works, electric light works, telephone lines or
street railways, or authorize the construction,
maintenance and operation of the same by others,
or purchase or lease such works from any person
or corporation, and they may sell and deliver the
surplus product or service of any such work, not
required by the city or its inh-abitants, to others
beyond the li1nits of the city."
s.ec. 10-8-22.

"Water ra.tes. - They may fix the rates to
be paid for the use of water furnished by the
city."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It is well to point out that Sections 10-7-10 to 10-7-14,
inclusive, were enacted in Chapter 17, 1917 Session Laws
and became effective May 8, 1917. The Public Utility Act
was first enacted at the same session in Chapter 47 Laws
of Utah 1917 and became effective by its terms ('Section
35 of Art. V thereof) upon approval of the governor,
which occurred March 8, 1917.
In addition to the foregoing statutes and to Sec. 29,
Art. VI of the Utah Constitution quoted and construed
in Logan City v. Public Utilitttes Commission, supra, we
wish to call attention to Section 6, Art. XI of the· Utah
Constitution which reads :
"M'UIJ'l.icipalrities forbidden to sell waterworks
or rights. No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of
any waterworks, water rights, or sources of water
supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled
hy it; but all such waterworks, water rights and
sources of water supply now owned or hereafter
to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall
be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges : Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any such
municipal corporation from exchanging waterrights, or sources of water supply, for other waterrights or sources of water supply of equal value,
and to be devoted in like manner to the public
supply of its inhabitants."

We think this constitutional provision is applicable here
to further demonstrate that a city's water rights and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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waterworks are inviolate from any intrusion thereon by
any commission which would attempt to regulate and
distribute any water belonging to the city, whether used
by the inhabitants or disposed of as surplus outside
the city li1ni ts as we shall point out further on in our
brief. This constitutional provision was applied in Hyde
Park v. Chambers, 99 Ut. 118, 104 P.2d 220, where the
court held void a contract whereby the city gave a perpetual right to use water from a tap outside the city
limits in consideration of a right-of-way for its pipeline.
The court there made this significant statement:
"As to whether or not they (Chambers et a1)
may purchase surplus water from the town to
be used out of the tap is, of course, a m.atter of
contract and a malter for the determina.tion of
the town officials. If they have surplus water
they may sell it within legal bounds. (Section 158-14 R.S.U. 1933 and Annotations thereunder.)"
(b) As shown by the text referred to by plaintiffs
in 38 A.M. J'ur. Sec. 570, P. 258, there is a division of
authority as to whether a city may, in the absence of
statutory authority, sell its surplus water or other services beyond its limits. The text says:
"There is a tendency, particularly in the later
cases, to take a more liberal view of municipal
powers, at least as to the surplus product of public
utilities plants and to allow extension of service
lines to~ points outside the municipal limits si~ce
a municipal corporation may lawfully engage in
the business of disposing of a surplus necessarily
acquired through the operation of a legitimate
public enterprise."
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This subject is annotated in 98 A.L.R. 1002 and Muir v.
Murray City, 55 Ut. 368, 186 P. 433 is cited as holding to
this view.
That ease invoJved a 1914 contract to deliver electric
energy to p·ersons along a power line constructed by
Murray City seven miles outside its limits. There was
then no statute authorizing sale of electric energy outside
the city limits as that authorization did not come until
Chapter 100, Laws of 1915, was enacted the following
year. There was only a general provision authorizing
a city to establish and operate an electrical p·ower plant
for its inhabitants. The court says:
"In constructing its works and obtaining its
power, it was its (city's) duty to pay due regard
to the future, and provide for the probable necessities of a rapidly increasing population. In such
case it could not but happen, as it did happen in
the present case, that when the works were completed and put into operation the city found it
had a large surplus of power over and above all
present demands, or probable demands for many
years to come. In these circumstances what did
plaintiff do~ It sought for customers to take its
surplus. It was unable to find a sufficient number.
It concluded to extend the line on to Granite,
which afforded a paying market for a small portion of its surplus. This the city did, and in doing
so, found it necessary to borrow the money and
create the indebtedness which constitutes the subject-matter of the present action. The investment
proved to be a profitable one, and while, as before stated, cities are not organized primarily as
profit making concerns, yet when it is. incidental,
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as in the instant case, to a proper exercise of its
legitimate powers, the making of the enterprise
a profitable one was highly -commendable. This
view is sustained by many well considered cases
which have been called to our attention. City of
Henderson v. Young, 119 Ky. 224, 83 S.W. 583, is
exactly in point. The third paragraph of the syllabi reads as follows :
" 'Ky. St. 1903, Section 3290, subsec. 5, authorizing cities of the third class to provide 'the city
and the inhabitants thereof' with light, etc., does
not prohibit the city from extending its electric
light service to points without the eity limits,
where it can do so with very little additional expense, and in such a way as to result in advantage to the city and its inhabitants.' Other
cases are cited, including Milligan v. Miles City
51 ~!ont. 374, 153 P. 276, L.R.A. 1916 C, 395; Colo.
Springs v. Colo. City, 42 Colo. 75, 94 P. 316."
The following cases from Arizona and Colorado follow the same reasoning.

City of Tucson v. Sims, 39 Ariz. 168, 4 P.
2d 673.
The City entered into a contract to supply water to a subdivision outside its boundaries under the same regulations, and at sa1ne charges it supplied its inhabitants.
The city extended a main to its boundary and the water
systern of the subdivision was there connected. The
agreement provided the city should take over and eontrol
and manage the distribution system at the time water
was turned into it and was to belong to the city thereafter.
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side delivery 50% above city rates. The land owners
brought suit for refund. The court first held this increase violated the contract. The city contended it had
no power to sell outside its limits. The court refers to a
statute which empowers city "to construct wells, systems, aqueducts and conduits to supply the city with
water or to purchase said sup·ply," and the Constitution
which empowers cities to engage in any business enterprise which any person, firm or corporation could engage in by virtue of a franchise from the city. Neither
of these provisions exp.ressly prohibit the city from supplying water outside its boundaries and it is immaterial
that there is no specific po,ver granting the power to do
so as in sup·plying water it is engaged in a proprietary
enterprise and in so doing it has "the same rights and
is subject to the same liabilities as private corporations
or individuals."
"Before it could furnish its own residents
with water it was necessary that it secure from
some source a sup·ply sufficient in quantity for
this purpose and that it install a system for distributing it. The record, it is true, contains a
stipulation that during the p·eriod covered by the
contract the city did not have a surplus storage
capacity, but this is unimportant in view of the
fact that it did supply the residents of Memlo
Park with water for 11 or 12 years before increasing the rates, something it could not have done
unless it had had at its source of supply n1ore
water than it needed for its citizens. And it must
likewise be true that its distributing system was
built to meet the nee·ds of a growing population
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and was, therefore, at that time capable of carrying water to a greater nun1ber of people than lived
within its boundaries ... Since the city, as a result of placing itself in a position to serve its own
users found itself in ovvnership and control of a
surplus dornestic "\Vater which could with little if
any additional cost be supplied to those outside
its lirnits and its income thereby increased, and
since no provision of its charter or of the statute
stood in the way of its doing so, its decision to follow the dictates of common business prudence was
clearly \vithin its po,ver."
Board of Conlmissioners v. City of Ft. Collins, 68
Colo. 364, 189 P. 929. The county comn1issioners petitioned the city to lay a water n1ain from the present
ter1ninus of the the city's main on Garfield Street to
carry "\Vater to the County poor farn1 and to persons who
1night later vvant to connect therewith and be added to
the city. It \vas proposed that when the water rents produced an arnount per annum equal to 20% of the cost of
the 1nain the city should take over the main and refund
the cost of construcing it. This action was for the refund.
~rhe cit~\~ claimed it had no power to enter into the proposal U8 it \Vas ultra vires. r~l_lhe court quotes from 19
R.C.L. 788, Sec.95:
" 'When ... as a necessary result of carrying
on a legitirnat(' public enterprise in a reasonably
prudent manner a surplus of the rnateria.l used
or distributed is acquired, or a by-product created,
a rnunicipal corporation rnay lawfully engage in
the business of disposing of such surplus or byproduct for profit without special legislative authority.' "
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The court cites a Colorado case, Milligan v. Miles
City:
" 'If it has a present surplus of water ... the
dictates of common business prudence require that
such surplus be sold, and the proceeds devoted to
public use.'"
It then says:
"A surplus product like water or light, may,
of course, be sold to consumers without the city,
and, if so, mains or conduits may be laid to points
without the City in order to convey the surplus
produce 'where there is demand for its use.' The
laying of the mains and the furnishing of the
water are both a part of the same business enterprise. There is no rule that limits the disposal of
surplus products only to cases where it may be
done without any expense whatever.
"It seems clear, therefore, that a city may incur a reasonable expense as an incident to the sale
of surplus water or other product to consumers
without th·e corporate limits, and there is no reason why such expense may not be incurred as the
result of taking over or acquiring a water main
running beyond its corporate limits."
The foregoing cases are authority for the proposition
that the city not only has the power to sell its surplus
water outside its limits, but it also has power to build
the necessary facilities to deliver such surplus water
to the users oustide its limits, and it is a legitimate function of a city to so manage its affairs as to create a substantial surplus to be disposed of outside its limits.
The additional question as to whether, in the disposition
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21
of its surplus water, the city would be subject to the
Public Service Commission is, of course, not determined
by these authorities, but will be presented in the next
part of this brief.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY IS
WITHOUT RIGHT OR AUTHORITY TO CONSTRUCT OR
OPERATE A WATER SYSTEM FOR THE DELIVERY OF
vVATER TO RETAIL CONSUMERS OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE LIMITS OR TO REGULATE OR CONTROL THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WATER THROUGH SUCH SYSTEM.

Plaintiffs concede that under the case of Logan City

v. Public Util. Com., supra, the Public Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the sale and delivery of
water within the city. In their brief in the lower court
they said that this was so because "granting to the Publice Service Commission jurisdiction over matters relating to questions of purely local self-government was inhibitive by constitutional provisions there discussed."
Plaintiffs seem to contend that the disposition by a. City
of its surplus water would not be a matter of purely
local self-government. That would be something over
which the City is ousted of jurisdiction and jurisdiction
is, therefore, vested in the Public Service Com1nission.
To state the proposition, in the face of the statutory provisions above quoted giving to cities the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over their water and waterworks, and
in the face of Section 29, Art. VI of the Utah ConstituSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22

tion, which provides, that the "Legislature shall not dele
gate to any special commission, private corporation or
association, any power to make, supervise or interfere
with any Inunicipal improvement, money, property or
effects, whether held in trust or otherwise-or to perfori? any municipal function," is to sho'v its utter fallacy.
Is not the surplus water owned by the city its property and effects~ Are not the 'vater pipes that it by
lavv has a right to install to deliver its surplus water
its property and effect~ To give the Public Service ConlInission jurisdiction over the disposition of this surplus
water would be in direct opposition to the above constitutional provision p-rohibiting intereference ,vith or supervision over municipal property and effects by such conlmission. To rule as plaintiffs contend would necessarily
mean that the Public Service Commission would have
an interest in and jurisdiction over all water rights, and
all distribution systems acquired by the city, for in no
other way could it assume to regulate and control the
disposition of surplus water, for ultimately it would have
to decide· what quantity of water was to be classified
as surplus water and \vhat distribution should be made
. of it. Certainly such a situation 'vould be in direct conflict with both the statutes and the constitution. Furthermore, if surplus water is held to be under the jurisdiction
of the Public S.ervice Commission then those supplied
therefrom would obtain a vested interest therein; they
could demand water as a matter of right, all contrur~,
to the provisions of Section 6, Art. XI, of the lTtah Constitution which provides that "no Inunicipal,corporation
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shall directly or indirectly lease, sell, alien or dispose of
any water works or water rights or sources of water supply," but must hold them for the benefit of its inhabitants.
Assuming the Public Service Coinmission has jurisdiction over the disposition of surplus water, how would
it protect the users of surplus water~ Would it determine
'-vhat is surplus~ Would it require the city to furnish
water to all who desire vvater ~ Would it fix the rates~
Would it require a continuance of service when the city
required the water for its inhabitants~ How could the
Con1mission supervise the disposition of surplus water
without supervising the entire supply and distribution
\vithin the city~ It must be clear that the only basis upon
which the city can dispose of its surplus water outside
its territorial limits is by vvay of contract with such
water users as it may desire to enter into contractual relations with and only upon the basis that surplus water
is involved.
Surely it cannot be held that all of the statutes hereinbefore quoted, relating to the power of cities over their
water and waterworks, fixing of rates, etc., are to be
li1nited in their application to water delivered to inhabitants only and as to the disposition of surplus water they
haYe no application and rnust be entirely disregarded;
this in the face of an express power granted the city to
sell its surplus water outside its limits. The language of
these statut/es import no such narrow construction. The
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tions, and applies equally to water service within. or without the corporate limits. It must follow that Section 108-22, authorizing the city to fix rates to be paid for the
use of water furnished by the city, must apply to surplus
water delivered outside the city as well as to water delivered within the city.
Much of plaintiffs' brief on the point now under
discussion is devoted to an attempt to show that the authorities relied on by the city before the court below
are not in point or do not sustain the city's position. We
shall refer to and quote from these authorities here and
later make son1e comment on plaintiffs' attempt to discredit their being authority in the present action.
Water Works Board v. City of Mobile, 43
So. 2d 409.

The Water Works Board was a corporation organized under statute with power to

r~aise

funds for the con-

struction of a water works plant by issuing revenue
bonds. The City of Mobile brought an action for a declaratory judgment to test the power of the water board.
A taxpayer of ~fobile was permitted to intervene. The
court says:
"In Atkinson v. City of Gadsden, 238 Ala. 556,
192 So. 152, we held that a water works board
has the auth.ority to supply 'vater not only to inhabitants of a municipality, but to the surrounding
territory. It follows that the Board has authority
to issue revenue bonds, the p~roceeds of which will
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
be used ultimately to furnish water to users in
the surrounding territory as well as to users within the municipality.
"The board may legally publish rates for the
sale of water and may enter into contracts with
the users of water without obtaining the approval
of the Alabama Public Service Commission of
such rates or contract."

Atlantic Canst. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 53 'S.E. 2d 165;
230 N.C. 365. The city made a charge of $100 per connection to its sewer system outside its limits. Under contract with Bashford it agreed to furnish water to the
subdivision outside the city limits, the mains to be constructed by Bashford but in accordance with the city
regulations, City to have supervision and control over
mains, laterals, etc., to read meters, to turn water on and
off and to collect water rents as its own, being same as
paid by other outside water users. Plaintiff objected
to the $100 fee having purchased 45 buiding lots in the
subdivision. Plaintiff contended that since no charge or
fee is required of owners within the city, the owners
outside the city could not be charged and that the fee
charged was unreasonable. The court says:
"Obviously the municipality is not authorized
by the statute, to compel owners of improved property located outside the city, but which may be
located upon or near one of its sewer lines or a
line which empties into the city's sewerage system,
to connect with the sewer line. But since it is optional with a city as to whether or not it will furnish water to residents outside its corporate limits
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and pern1it such residents to connect their sewer
facilities with the sewerage systen1 of the city,
or with any other sewerage system which connects
\Vith the city syste1n, it may fix the terms upon
\Vhich the service may be rendered and its facilities used. G.S. Sec. 160-255; G.S. 160-256; Kennerly v. Town of Dallas, 215 N.C. 532, 2 S.E. 2d
538; Williamson v. City of High Point, 213 N.C.
96, 195 S.E. 90; George v. City of Ashville, 4 Cir.,
80 F. 2d 50, 103 A.L.R. 568.
"The North Carolina Utilities Commission
has no jurisdiction to fix or supervise the fees and
charges to be made by a 1nunicipality for connections \vith a city sewerage systein, either within
or without its corporate limits. G.S. Sec. 62-30
(5); G.S. Sec. 62-122 (3). Therefore, a city is free
to establish by contract or by ordinance such fees
and charges for services rendered to residents outside its corporate lin1its. as it n1ay deem reasonable
and pToper. G.'S. Sec. 160-240; G.S. Sec. 160-249;
G.S. Sec. 160-284.
"The status of a municipal corporation that
extends the services of its public utilities beyond
its corporate limits, is quite different from that
of a public service corporation which holds a franchise from the State and whose rates are fixed
by the North Carolina Utilities Commission, G.S.
Sec. 62-67.
"The relationship existing between the plaintiff and the defendant is contractual, 'vhether it is
based on the Bashford contract or the ordinances
and the rules and regulations adopted by the governing board of the City of R.aleigh. The (lrfe:-:'1 ·
ant has no legal right to compel residents living
outside its corporate li1nits to avail themselYes
of the services which 1nay be offered by its public
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utilities. On the other hand, in the absence of a
contract providing otherwise, such residents are
not in position to compel the city to make such
services available to them. Childs v. City of
Columbia 87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296, 34 L.R.A.N.S.. ,
542; Board of Sup'vrs of Henrico County v. City
of Richmond, 162 V a. 14, 172 S.E. 356; City of
Phoenix v. Kasu1n, 54 .£_<\riz. 470, 97 P. 2d 210."

Fillghunt v. Tow·n of Selrna, 76 S.E. 2d 368, N.C. The
court says:
"1-\.. 1nunicipality \vhich operates its own
\Vater works is under no duty in the first instance
to furnish water to persons outside its limits. It
has the discretionary po,ver, however, to engage
in this undertaking. G.S. Sec. 160-255.
.. \Vhen a municipality exercises this discretionary power it does not assun1e the obligations
of a I)ublic Service Corporation toward non resident consumers. G.S. Sec. 62-30 (3), 67 C.J.
\\T aters, Sec. 739. It retains the authority to specify the tern1s upon 'vhich non residents 1nay obtain
its \Vater. Atlantic Co. v. City of Raleigh, 230 N.C.
3G5, 53 s. E. 2d 165."

Tozcn of Grin~csland v. City of Washington, 66 S.E.
2d 79-!-. In 1924 plaintiff city constructed power transrnission lines from defendant city's power plant. These
lines passed through Chocowinty, an unincorporated village. Plaintiff purchased power frou1 defendant for distribution to its inhabitants and sold the power to residents of Chocowint_y. This continued until1949 when the
contract \Vith defendant city \Va~ terrninated. Plaintiff
then purchased po\ver fro1n the City of Greenville and
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furnished power to its san1e customers. Defendant city
then built a parallel po"\ver line and began serving plaintiff's village customers. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from distributing electric power in the area
served by plaintiff. The court. says:
"The right of the Town of Grimesland to construct and maintain an electric system for the distribution and sale of electric current to consumers
beyond its corp-orate limits, and to own and operate transmission lines for that purpose along the
highway or over and upon rights of way acquired,
is not questioned in this action. G.S. Sec. 160-255.
But this legislative authority would not be regarded as eonferring the right to exclude competition in the territory served. Having the right to
engage in this business gives no exclusive franchise, and if fro1n lawful competition its business
be curtailed, it would seen1 that no actionable
wrong would result, nor "\Vould it be entitled to
injunctive relief therefrom. * * *
"The plaintiff's positon is that if it be conceded that the defendant City of Washington, in
the operation of an electric power plant for the
benefit of its citizens, was given authority to extend its lines and furnish electric service to consumers beyond its corporate limits, nevertheless
when the defendant in doing so undertook to construct and operate a public service system in
direct compettiion, by parallel lines, with the public service systen1 of the plaintiff already established and serving the same territory, it became
amenable to the regulatory requirement of the
general statute, G.S. Sec. 62-101, that it must first
obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Utilities Commission. Plaintiff
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maintains that considering the purpose of the statutes requiring supervision by the Utilities Commission together with the evils which would result
from competition in the same locality between two
public service systems, it was in the legislative
mind that the same rule should be applied to municipal corporations as that applied to private corporations rendering public service.
"The statute relied on by plaintiff as authority for the position that defendant before constructing its trans1nission lines outside its limits
was required to obtain such a certificate reads a.s
follo,vs: 'No person, or corporation, their lessees,
trustees, or receivers shall hereafter begin the
construction or operation of any public utility
plant or systen1 or acquire ownership or control of,
either directly or indirectly, without first obtaining from the Utilities Commission a certificate
that public convenience and necessity requires, or
will require, such construction, acquisition, or operation: Provided, that this section shall not apply to new construction in progress on May 27,
1931, nor to construction into territory contigious
to that already occupied and not receiving si1nilar
service from another utility, nor to construction
in the ordinary conduct of business.' The statute
designates those upon "\vhom the requirement is
imposed as 'person, or corporation their lessees,
trustees or receivers.' These descriptive "\Vords
are not those ordinarily applicable to, or to be
thought of as en1bracing cities and towns. And the
business coming within the regulatory provisions
of the statute is designated as 'the construction
or operation of any public utility plant or system.'
If the Legislature intended this statute to include
municipal corporations, no distinction was n1ade
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rate limits. It Vlould not seem to be a reasonable
co_nstruction of this statute to adopt the view that
the Legislature intended to prescribe that no city
or town could operate an electric light plant for
the serv~ce ~of its citizens without obtaining this
certificate from the Utilities Commission. Examining the language of the statute, the implication
of a private corporation is unmistakable. Limitation upon the granted power of a municipal eorporation to construct and operate for the public
benefit an electric distribution syste1n, by requiring such a certificate as a condition p-recedent,
will not be inferred in the absence of definite expression of legislative 'viii.

* * *
"Giving due consideration to all pertinent
statutes as well as the decisions of this court, "\Ve
reach the conclusion that the court below has
ruled correctly, and that the defendant City of
Washington was not required to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity fron1 the
Utilities ·Commission before engaging in the distribution of electric current to consumers outside
its corporate limits within Beaufort County, and
that the judgment dismissing plaintiff's action
should be affirmed."

City of Phoenix v. Wright, so· P. 2d 390, 52 Ariz.
227. Application by plaintiff City for 'vrit of prohibition
to compel plaintiffs as members of the Arizona Corporation Comn1ission, to desist from atten1pting to assume
jurisdiction over plaintiff and its municipally owned and
operated water system in the distribution of water to
consumers outside its corporate limits. Writ made permanent. The court held that the· city had the right to
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furnish water through its 'vater plant to consumers living
outside its limits. It is argued that in serving persons
outside the corporate lin1its the city acts in its proprietary capacity and so is subject to the control of the corporation com1nission. The court ans,vers this argument
by pointing out that in the carrying on of its water distribution within its limits it is acting in a proprietary capacity as rnuch as when distributing \Vater outside its
lin1its. Sec. 8 of Art. 15 of the Constitution provides.
~~ .:\11

corporations other than municipal engaged in carrying persons or property for hire;
or in furnishing gas, oil or electricity for light,
fuel, or po\ver; or in furnishing water for irrigation, fire protection, or other public purposes,
shall be deented public service corporations."
T'he court cites J1 enderson r. City of Phoenix, 76 P.

:2d ;j21, \vhich held the corporation co1nn1ission had no
jurisdiction over cities engaged in carrying passengers
for hire. '~rhe court says:
"Section 2, article 15, supra, by its express
language, applies to the furnishing of \\'ater for
any public purpose, in the sa1ne 1nanner and to
the sa1ne extent as it does to the carrying of passengers for hire, and we think it follows. that the
ronstitution, by neces;-~ary implication, forbids the
regulation by the corporation eonnnission of
1nunicipal corporations "\vhich furnish water for
public purposes to the same extent as it does
1nunicipal corporations which furnish transportation for hire. The lin1itations placed hy the constitution on the power of the corporation commission over municipal c-orporations is not predicated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

32

upon the place 'vhere they do business, but upon
the fact that they are municipal corporations. Such
being the ease, if a municipal corporation may
lawfully furnish water for public purposes, to
consumers outside of its boundaries, it is no more
subject to regulation by the corporation commission in so doing than it is in the furnishing of
water to those inside of its boundaries. The obvious spirit and purpose of section 2, article 15,
supra, is to leave the regulation of municipal corporations, and their acts, where it has always
been ever since such corporations have existedin the hands of the legislative branch of the government-instead of transferring their control to
another agency created by the constitution.
"We conclude, therefore, that under the constitution of Arizona, as it now stands, the corporation commission h·as no jurisdiction to regulate
the actions of a municipal corporation engaged in
the service and delivery of "\Vater for public purposes to consun1ers either inside or outside of its
corporate limits."
Phoenrix v. K asun1, 97 P. 2d 210, 127 A.L.R., Page

84. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant city fron1 increasing its water rates to custon1ers outside city limits,
claiming the rates fixed by the ordinance were excessive,
confiscatory, unreasonable and exorbitant. Defendant
city filed n1otion to dismiss on the ground court had no
jurisdictio~1.

Trial court overruled motion and issued

temporary injunction, from which plaintiff appealed.
Judgment reversed and injunction vacated. The court
says:
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"We have previously laid down certain rules
governing municipal corporations operating public utilities, both within and without their corporate limits. They 1nay be stated as follows: (a)
a rnunicipal corporation has a right to furnish
\Vater through its municipal water plant to consumers without, as well as within, its corporate
li1nits; ('b) \vhile furnishing water in this manner the state corporation comrnission has no jurisdiction to regulate its actions towards consumers,
vvhether inside or outside of such limits; (c) the
legislature is the only body \vhich has the right to
regulate the rates charged by a municipal corporation operating a public utility, and it has plenary power in that respect except as limited by the
Constitution; (d) a municipality may not compel
consumers outside of its corporate limits to purchase water from it, nor can it be compelled to
furnish such water to non-residents; (e) a municipality can only dispose of its surplus water outside of its corporate limits subject to the prior
right of its inhabitants in case of shortage. We
think these propositions are either declared specifically or impliedly by the cases of City of
Phoenix v. Wright, 52 Ariz. 227, 80 P. 2d 390;
Crandall v. Town of Safford, 47 Ariz. 402, 56 P.
2d 660; City of Tucson v. Si1ns, 39 Ariz. 168, 4 P.
2d 673; 11enderson v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz.
280, 76 P. 2·d 321.
"But it is contended, adrnitting all of this to
be true, the courts have the inherent right to deterrnine the reasonableness of charges rnade by
a Inunicipality, so long as it does furnish water
outside of its limits. rrhis is urged upon the basis
that the municipality, \vhen it undertakes this,
is operating a public utility, and that public
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utilities are always subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts as to whether their rates are unjust,
arbitrary, or confiscatory.
"The distinguishing characteristic of a public
utility is the devotion of pTivate pTopeTty by the
owner to such a use that the public generally, or
at least that part of the public which has been
served and has accepted the service, has the right
to demand that such service, so long as it is continued, shall be conducted with. reasonable efficiency and under proper charges. When private
property is thus devoted to the public use, certain
reciprocal rights and duties are raised by iinplication of law as between the utility and the persons whon1 it serves, and no contract is necessary
to give then1. Inas1nuch, therefore, as one \vho
devotes his property to a use in \Yhich the public
has an interest, in effect grants to the public an
interest in the use thereof, he must submit to being
controlled by the public for the co1nmon good to
the extent of the interest thus created and so long
as such is continued. Thiunn v. Illinois, 94 US 113,
24 Led. 77. The right inherent in the public authorities to control the rates to be charged by
those operating public utilities is based on the
fact that they o\ve a legal duty to the public to
furnish certain serYices and can, therefore, be regula ted hy the public as to the price to be charged
for such services. It is upon these basic principles
that the entire superstructure of public regulation
of public utility corporations is based.
"But the fact that a business or enterprise
is, generally speaking, a public utility does not
u1ake every service perfor1ned or rendered by
those O\\·ning or operating it a public service, \vith
its consequent duties and burdens, but they may
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

35

act in a private capacity as distinguished from
their public capacity, and in so doing are subject
to the same rules as any other private person so
acting. Killam v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co. 122 Va. 541,
96 SE 506, 6 ALR 701. Since the basis of the regulation is that a duty is owed the public, regardless of contract, it follows as a corollary that
when the duty which arises is based purely on
contract and not on law, express or implied, the
situation is governed by the rules applying to
private contracts in general, notwithstanding that
one of the parties 1nay be operating a public
utility.
'"Was the service \vhich the City of Phoenix
rendered to plaintiffs and those in like situation
\vith the1n, based upon contract or law? If it was
based upon a legal right, regardless of contract,
by all the decisions the courts may determine
whether the terms on vvhich he obtains this service are reasona;ble or not. On the other hand, if
his right to receive service is based solely on a
voluntary contract with the city, then that contract is subject to review by the courts only in the
same manner as any other private contract, and it
is not for them to determine, whether its provisions are arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory."
*
*
>)(:

"After a careful consideration of all the
authorities, we are of the opinion that the controlling factors in the present case are that the
city \vas under no obligation, as a matter of law,
to furnish any service to the plaintiffs; that the
relationship between them was purely contractural in its nature, and that such being the case, the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rates
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

36
fixed :by the contract are not subject to review by
the eourt. The only right which it has under the
circumstances is to determine whether the citv
is complying with the terms of its contract, sine~
there is no allegation that there was any fraud
in its inception."
City of Englewood v. City
Colo ....... , 229 P. 2d 667.

of

Demer, _____ _

Englewood sued to enjoin Denver fron1 collecting
increased water rates from domestic water consu1ners
in Englewood. The case was dismissed. The Colorado
constitutional provision is identical in language with
our Section 29, Article "'VI, except that our provision
prohibits the delegation of the selection of a capitol
site, which pTovision is omitted in the Colorado Constitution. The Colorado Statute gives the city power "to
sup·ply water from their \Vater systems to consmners
outside of the corporate limits .... and to collect therefor such charges and upon such conditions and limitations
as said towns and cities n1ay impose by ordinances."
Combining Section 10-8-14, 10-8-22 and 10-7-14 of our
statutes, above quoted, \Ve have the sa1ne provisions as
Colorado.
The Colorado Court says :
"T·he prime purpose, and we n1ay add, the
only purpose, was to supply water to the residents
of Denver and the permission granted the Englewood residents by the ordinance, supra to eonnect
. the corporate lines was, and is, \vholly
'
w1th
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cipal affair. While operating its water system,
and serving \vithin its borders, it could more appropriately be termed a 'munipical utility' rather
than the broad and all inel usive term of 'public
utility', because within the territorial limits, the
word 'public' is confined to the citizens of Denver
and the service is open to all members of the
Denver public who 1nay require it, and who may
den1and it within the limits of its capacity to
serve. It is at once to be seen that the act of supplying water to users beyond the territorial limits
under the cir'cumstances here does not impress
the business with a public interest, because the outside users in Englewood have no right to demand
the service."
The Court then goes on to say:
'"In the Ina.tter here involved, Denver has
acted in its proprietary or quasi-private capacity,
as distinguished from the exercise of governmental power beyond the municipal boundary. Even if
the pertinent constitutional provision and statute
hereinbefore set out were not controlling, this
proprietary function \vould not bring it within
the public utility statute, section 3, chapter 137,
35 C.S.A., the applicable part of which is as follows: 'Public utility defined * *
The ternt
'public utility', when used in this chapter, includes
every * * * water corporation, person or municipality operating for the purpose of supplying
the public for domestic, mechanical or public uses
* * *.'It cannot rightfully be contended that Denver in the operation of its water system is operating for the purpose of supplying Englewood or
any other part of the public outside of Denver
with water. In its function of acquiring and supplying Denver residents with water, as a muni')(<.

-
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cipal function, it is free of the jurisdiction of the
Public Utilities Commission or any other commission created by the legislature.* * *"
"We find little need to enter into a lengthy
discussion of what is or what is not a public utility, beeause we would ultimately apply the almost
universally accepted test, which summarized is,
that to fall into th.e class of a public utility, a business or enterprise must be impressed with a public interest and that those engaged in the conduct
thereof must hold themselves out as serving or
ready to serve all members of the public, who 1nay
require it, to the extent of their capacity. The
nature of the service must be such that all members of the public have an enforceable right to
demand it. Application of this test to the facts
before us reveals that this extra-territorial supply
of water is on a nonutility basis, and in so operating, under express statutory auth.ority, it can collect such charges therefor and make such conditions and limitations as it may impose, all without
liability of any vested right for a continued sale
or leasing thereof. We find, and so determine,
that Denver holds such water as is not needed
by it for immediate use in its proprietary capacity, in which it has a well defined property right;
and section 35 of Article \T of the Colorado Constitution, sup-ra, withholds from the legislature
all power to dedicate to any co1n1nission any supervision of this prop·erty right, thus precluding any
jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission.
Prior to the enactment of the Utility Commission
Act, the legislature in 1911 enacted section 22 of
chapter 163, '35 C.S.A., giving incorporated to,vns
and cities the right to supply water from their
water systems to consumers outside of their corporate limits. It is contended by Englewood counSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
sel that the 1913 Public Utility A:ct repealed this
law by implication. This argument seems to rest
on the general theory th.at the subsequent 1913
Public Utility Act takes precedence over the prior
enactment. It is the universal rule that repeals
by implication are not favored. This doctrine
1nay be invoked \vhere a conflict clearly and unavoidably exists. We may rightfully assume that
the 1913 Public Utility Act \vas passed with full
knowledge of the existence of the 1911 statute. It
may further he assumed that the legislature did
not consider the 1913 act to be on the same subject as the 1911 Act. If such "'-ras the legislative
assumption, it was correct. The two Acts are not
on related subjects and, of course, no repugnancy
exists. As will be seen, the 1911 Act, supra, had
only to do with the empowering of incorporated
municipalities to supply water frorn their systems
to outside consumers upon such rates and limitations as the municipality might see fit to impose;
while the 1913 Public Utility Act fixed the control
of pujblic utilities. We must believe that the legislature was cognizant of the constitutional limita.tion placed on the Public Utili ties Commission,
or any other commission, over rnunicipal corporations. This limitation is based upon the fact that
they are municipal corporations. Section 32, Article V, Colorado Constitution, supra. We therefore determine that the two acts are not inconsistent and that the latter Act does not expressly
or impliedly repeal the former."
This case was followed in City of Colo. Spriwgs v.
Public Utiliti.es Co1n., 248 P. 2d 311.
State ex rel West Side Improvement Club v. Department of Public Ser,vice of Washington, 58 P. 2d 350.
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The City of Brem1nerton owns and operates a water
system by which it furnishes water for its inhabitants
and to persons living outside its limit. The club is con1posed of outside residents who are users of the citv's
water. The club filed application with the Department
of Public Service to hold a hearing and determine the
price that water users outside the city should pay. The
department dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction and this action was brought against the depart.
ment and its mem'bers. The question is whether the department has jurisdiction to fix rates to users outside the
city limits. The court first says:
"Without specifically referring to the acts
of the legislature, it appears to be definitely settled that (a) a city owning a water system may
extend its service to those living outside of its
corp·orate limits; and (b) that within the corporate lirnits the city has the right to control the
price or rate at which the service will be rendered.
"Inquiry 1nust then be directed as to whether,
for the service outside of the corporate limits, the
department of public service or the city has the
right to fix the rate or price, and this depends
upon the construction to be given to certain statutory provisions."
The court goes on to show that in 1911 the legislature enacted the Public Utilities Act. Originally, the
Act did not authorize the department to fix rates of a
water system owned by a city or town. In 1917 the
Legislature for the first time authorized a city to extend
a water systen1 owned by it to service users outside its
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corporate limits, but provided that "such portion of such
public utility that extends beyond the corporate limits of
any city, shall be operated at such prices and under such
rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Public
Service Commission."
In 1933 an Act was passed to the effe'ct that when any
city or to\vn owning and operating a water system desires to extend such utility beyond its limits it 1nay construct any addition or extension to said system and sell
\Vater to any co1nn1unity, corporation or person desiring
to purchase the same and may enter into contracts for
furnishing \Vater, "fixing the terms upon which such
outside distribution system will be installed and the rates
at \vhich and n1anner in which payment shall be made
for the service rendered."
There is no express repeal of the 1917 provisions.
rrhe court held that the 1917 law and the 1933 law were
repugnant and irreconcilable in that the first give the
Public Service Commission power to fix prices, while
the latter gave the city the right to fix prices. The Legislature intended to give the city the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction over the rates at which it would furnish
\Vater to outsiders and to take fron1 the deparhnent
jurisdiction which it previously had had. The \vrit of
1nandate

\Vas

denied, even though repeal by implication

is not favored.
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The following cases from California, while not directly in point, are instructive, and tend to bear out defendant city's position liere.

Pasadena v. Ra.ilroad Co,mmission, 183 Cal. 526, 192
P25, 10 A.L.R. 1425. Pasadena owned an ele~ctric power
plant and in 1909 extended its wires to serve the adjoining city of South Pasadena. In 1919·, on complaint of the
Pacific Light and Power Company, which also supplies
power to South Pasadena, the Railroad Co1mnission,
under the Public lTtilities Act, ordered Pasadena to file
with the ·Commission a co1nplete schedule of its rates.
Pasadena brought this action to annul this order, on
theory that the Public Utilities Act has no application
to any public service carried on by a municipal corporation. The powers of the Railroad Commission were derived from Sections 22 and 23 of Article 12 of the Constitution whi~ch state:
"Every private corporation, and every individual or association of individuals, owning,
operating, 1na.naging or controlling any commercial pipeline, plant or equip1nent ... for the production, generation, transmission or furnishing
of heat, light, "\Yater or po,ver to or for the public
. . . is hereby declared to be a public utility subject to su·ch control and regulation by the Railroad Commission as 1nay be provided by the
Legislature."
The court held this proVIsion had no application
to a municip~l corporation and annulled the order. The
court repudiates the argument that a municipal corporaSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion in supplying water, light or power to its inh.abitants
is not acting in its governmental capacity as sovereign
but is acting in a proprietary capacity, and so must be
subject to the Utilities Act.
"It is not true that a city is a private corporation when carrying on a municipally owned public
utility."
Dwrant v. Cvty of Beverly Hills, 102 P. 2d 759. Plain-·
tiff sued for declaratory relief in relation to the rates
charged hin1 by defendant for water served to him in an
unincorporated area outside the city limits, known as
7
\ \ est Hollywood. l-Ie claimed the right to water at the
sarne rate as paid by inhabitants of defendan-t city. Plaintiff and others had been served by a private utility until
defendant bought the entire plant and operated it as a
part of its municipal plant serving water to its inhabitants. The rates fixed by the city, while more than the
rates charged inhabitants, were less than those previously charged by the private utility. The court reversed
judgment for plaintiff, saying:

""There are certain legal principles applicable
to the controversy which should be stated at this
time. 'A grant of power to provide and supply
water to a city and its inhabitants, authorizes a
city to carry on a system and supply water to persons outside its limits, whenever it becomes necessary or convenient to do so in order to accomplish the main purpose of supplying water to
those \\'ithin.' South Pasadena v. Pasadena L. &
W. Co., 152 Cal. 579, 580, 93 P. 490. When necessary for its purposes a n1unicipality 1nay purchase
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an entire water plant or system so that 'after operating the system and supplying the persons
entitled to use the water, it could devote the surplus to the use of the inhabitants of the city.'
Fellows v. Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 64, 90 0. 137,
141; South Pasadena v. Pasadena L. & W. Co.,
152 Cal. 590, 93 P. 490, sup,ra. In these operations
the municipality is not selling surplus or excess
vvaters to the prior users. The purchase of the
system is impressed vvith a trust and the city,
'with respect to this part of the water, will hold
title as a mere trustee, bound to apply it to the
use of those benficially interested.' Id., 152 Cal.
at page 594, 93 P. at page 496. The continued
supplying of water to the outside territory, being
incidental to the main purpose, is a municipal
affair. Id., 152 Cal. at page 594, 93 P. 490.
* * * *
"The power of the city to fix rates to be
eharged those custon1ers residing within its boundaries is incidental to the power to 'establish and
operate' public utility systems conferred by section 19 of article XI of the Constitution. This
power to fix the charges for service by the Inunicipality when operating a municipally owned public utility is not controlled by section 23 of article
XII of the Constitution. Citv of Pasadena v.
Railroad Commission, 183 Cai. 526, 534, 192 P.
25, 10 A.L.R. 1425; J ochimsen v. Los Angeles, 54
Cal. Ap·p. 715, 716, 202 P. 902. The power of the
city to furnish services to inhabitants outside its
boundaries is a part of the constitutional grant
found in section 19 of article XI, wherein the city
is authorized to establish and operate the utility;
and since the operation of the system in the outside territory is but incidental to the main purpose
of service to the inhabitants of the city, it follows
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as of course that the municipal authorities enjoy
the same right to fix the charges to be paid by
those served in the outside territory as it has to
fix those charged in its own inhabitants. And,
upon the ruling of the Pasadena case that these
extra-territorial operations are the 'municipal
affair' of the operating city, it follows that the
city council n1ust, at least in the first instance,
be held to have the power to fix all rates to be
charged for its public utility services to those
\Yithin and without its boundaries."
Cdy of llfill rrallcy

V.

Sexton, 106 P. 2d 455. Plain-

tiff sought a \Yrit of rnandate to compel defendant as city
treasurer to sign certain municipal bonds authorized
by the electors of the city to issue for the purpose of raising funds to acquire and operate a municipal transportation systern bet\veen Mill V ailey and San F'rancisco and
intern1ediate points. Defendant's refusal was based on
the theory that the city's funds could not be expended
for a service \vhich \vould be in part for the benefit of
non-residents and non-taxpayers. Section 19 of article
11 of the Constitution authorized n1unicipal corporations
to establish and operate certain named utilities including
transportation and authorized furnishing such services
to inhabitants outside its houndarie~. The court ordered
the writ be issued, saying:
"R.espondent relies on Taylor v. Dimmitt, 336
Mo. 330, 78 S.W. 2d 841, 98 A.L.R. 995, and Dyer
v. Newport, 123 Ky. 203, 94 S.W. 25; holding that
a eity could not construct \Vorks beyond its boundnries to supply public utility service to nonresidents consun1ers. We are not impressed \vith the
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applicability of those cases in view of our constitutional grant of power, nor with the reasoning
of the opinions generally. If a city is endowed
with the power to sell excess utility service, the
means of performance whereby the service can be
made and supplied are necessarily implied 1n
the grant of power to sell.
* * * *
"The respondent attacks the installation of
the system on the grounds that it would require
the taxpayers of the city to support the transportation system not only for its own inhabitants but
also for those of the traveling public outside its
boundaries. This it is said might be a gift of
public funds for private purposes and hence contrary to the p·rovisions of article IV, section 31,
of the Constitution. Conlin v. Board of Supervisors, 99 Cal. 17, 33 P. 753, 21 L.R.A. 474, 37
Am. St. Rep. 17, and Goodall v. Brite, 11 Cal. App.
2d 540, 54 P~ 2d 510, are cited in support of the
argument. Neither :case is in point. They involved
instances of direct gifts of public funds for private purposes. Here we have a case where public
service is exchanged for a compensation and it
will not be assu.med that the city will misuse the
power by giving the transportation free. On the
con;trary, it will be presumed tha.t the city will exercise the p,ower fairly atnd in accordance with
the p~trposes of the statutes. That nonta:xpayers
living outside the boundaries of the city may thus
obtain an advantage at the risk of the taxpayers
within the city is no more serious obstacle to the
validity of the scheme than that nontaxpayers
living within the city limits may enjoy the same
advantage. But, if this feature of the general
s:cheme is objectio~able on the ground stated, it
goes to the entire plan of public utility service
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47
both within and without the municipal boundaries.
If the plan is economically unsound for this reason, the objections raised are administrative and
legislative, rather than judicial. We have here
to consider only that the constitution and the
statutes h·ave conferred the power upon the eity
and the wisdom of the legislation is not a matter
for us to decide."
Plaintiffs n1ake the assertion that the City in selling
\Vater outside its boundaries departs fron1 its municipal
functions of governing its inhabitants. No authority
is cited for such assertion. We submit on the contrary
that in the disposition of its surplus water outside its
boundaries the city still continues to act as a governn1ental unit, still performs a proper 1nunicipal function
to the sa1ne extent and in the same manner as it does in
the disposition of its water within its boundaries. The
case of Ml~P~r v. Murray City, supra, unquestionably supports that proposition. Sec. 10-8-14 must be taken as a
grant of municipal po\ver and function, both in the authorization of the acquisition of waterworks and in the
sale of surplus water. The case of Pasadena v. R.R. Com.,
supra, expressly states that a city is not a private corporation, when carrying on a n1unicipally owned public
utility.
Notwithstanding that Sec. 54-2-1 states that the term
corporation includes a municipal corporation, the court
in Loga,n City v. Public Utilities Com., supra, held that
cities were not subject to the provisions of the Public
Utilities Act as to the sale and disposition of electric
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energy generated by a municipally owned and op~erated
plant. To hold otherwise would he to violate the provisions of the constitution \Vhich gives a city exelusiYe
jurisdiction over its property and effects. That reason
applies equally to surplus energy as to energy consumed
by inhabitants. Plaintiffs are forced to take the position
that the Public Service Commission should have control
over the sale of surplus water to non-residents in order
to protect them in their water supply. We ask how is the
Public Service Co1nn1ission going to protect non-residents
to assure then1 a water supply~ By giving them a vested
interest in the city's water supply~ By con1pelling the
city to furnish water regardless of the city's needs~
Surely, the com1nission has no means or po,ver to provide
some kind of auxiliary supply of water for such consumers. If these consumers are to be assured of a perpetual supply of "rater from the city's \Vater supply, by
and thru the Public Service Con1mission assuming control over that water supply, what becomes of the constitutional provisions of Sec. 6, Art. XI which prohibits
the sale or other disposition of any part of the. city's.
waterworks, water rights or sources of supply~ Can the
Legislature ignore that provision and create a situation
such that any city which attempts to sell its surplus
water automatically avoids the constitutional prohibition~ The right granted to sell surplus water outside its
li1nits cannot beco1ne the 1neans by which a city avoids
the ·constitutional inhibition and loses for its inhabitants
some of its water supply. The imaginary evils which
plaintiffs envision in a city being left uncontrolled by the
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Public Service Commission in the disposition of its surplus 'vaters is not any justification for abandoning the
constitutional provisions referred to. Furthermore, no
city, including defendant city, can undertake any extensive sale of water outside its limits. It can only temporarily dispose of, by contract, such water as it might
not presently need for its inhabitants. This does not present any situation frought \vith evils. The city can give
no perpetual right to receive 'vater. Its surplus must always be very much limited in quantity and n1ust always
be subject to the prior rights of the inhabitants of the
city. The sale of surplus water is 1nerely incidental to
the n1ain purpose of supplying water to the city's inhabitants. In the face of such undisputable conditions the
specter of a gigantic octupus, reaching out its limitless
tenacles in every direction to str'angle and destroy others
selling 'vater, fades as an imaginary night 1nare resorted
to only to distort the real issues. In this connection it
should be remen1bered that this is a suit to declare rights,
not to enjoin unlawful acts.
Neither in their petition nor in their brief have plaintiffs correctly quoted Sec. 5-J-2-1 U.C.A. 1953, defining
a public utility. The actual language is as follows:
~·The

term ~public utility', includes every
co1nmon carrier, gas corporation, electric corporation, telephone corporation, telegraph corporation,
7,i'ater corporation, heat corporation and warehousemen where the service i,s performed. for, or
the comn~odi,ty delivered to, the zntblic' generally."
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Then follows the language:
"And whenever any . . . water corporation
... p·erforms a service for or delivers a co1nmodity
to the public for which any compensation or payment whatsoever is received, such ... water cor~
poration . . . is hereby declared to be a public
utility, subject to the jurisdiction and regulation
of the commission and the provisions of this title."
s.uch definition clearly indicates that "to fall into
the class of a public utility, a business or enterprise must
be impressed with a public interest and that those engaged in the conduct thereof must hold themselves out as
serving or ready to serve all members of the public who
may require it, to the extent of their capacity. The nature of the service must be such that all members of the
public have an enforceable right to demand it." City
of Englewood v. City & County of Denver, supra.
The definition that plaintiffs have omitted is the
first sentence of Sec. 54-2-1, aibove quoted, which requires
a delivery of service to the "public generally." The next
sentence uses the words "perfonns a service for or delivers a commodity to the public, which must be synonymous with the previous language to the "public generally." Not only have plaintiffs misquoted the definition of a public utility, as above p·ointed out, but they
have omitted to quote or refer to Subsection 26 of Sec.

54-2-1, which defines a 'vater corporation as including
"every corporation and person ... owning, controlling,
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ice 'vithin this state." This again emphasizes the essential elen1ent that the systen1 1nust be for the public
generally, the service must be a public service. Corporations delivering water to their own stockholders are expressly excluded. The definition is restrictive; it excludes all corporations and persons not coming within its
express language. As held by the Englewood case, it
cannot rightly be contended that Salt Lake City in operating its water system is operating it for the purpose of
supplying water to any part of the public outside its
limits. It is not operating in any sense as a public utility.
It is engaged in supplying water to its residents as a
1nunicipal function under power granted it by the Legislature 'vith the right, also granted by the legislature, to
dispose of its surplus water by contract to those of its
O\Vn selection and upon terms satisfactory to it, and without anyone having any vested right to demand such
\Vater. The city is not engaged in delivering water to
the ((public generally" from its present system. It
couldn't if it \vanted to as its present syste1n is held and
must be used for its inhabitants. A different situation
would 'be involved where it acquired and held a water
system, not for its own inhabitants, but for the purpose
of supplying persons outside its limits with water. So
long as the city is only attempting to dispose, by contract,
of \Vater resulting as a surplus over that required by its
jnhabitants, it follows that the basis of the right of regulation by the Public Service Commission is absent, since
the basis of that right is "that a duty is owed the public,
regardless of contract," and "it follows as a corollary
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that 'vlien the duty "\Vhich arises is based purely on contract and not on la\v, express or implied, the situation is
governed by the rules applying to private contracts in
general." City of Phoenix v. Kasum, supra.
Counsel brush aside the case of City of Phoenix v.
Wright, supra, with the statement that because the Constitution of Arizona excluded municipal corporations
from being regulated by the corporation commission that
case has no control here. We ask what difference is there
between such an exclusion by express language and the
exclusion made by this court in construing pertinent provisions in our Constitution bringing about the same results~ Counsel concede our Constitution inhibits the Commission from jurisdiction over the distribution of water
within the city, but argue that it has jurisdiction as to
distri'bution of water outside the city. Would not such
an argument be equally applicable if the Constitution contained the exemption as in the Arizona case~ The fact is,
such argument was 1nade in the Arizona case and rejected, with the statement that the constitutional liinitation upon the ·Co'lnmission is not predicated upon the
place where the cities do business, but up·on the fact that
they are n1unicipal corporations. "Such being the ease,
if a municipal corp·oration 1nay lavvfully furnish water
for public purposes to constuners outside its boundaries,
it is no more subject to regulation by the corporation in
so doing than it is in furnishing 'vater to those inside
its. boundaries."
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Counsel dispose of City of Phoenix v. Kasu,m,, supra,
·with the san1e superficial conclusions. The discussion
in that case as to what constitutes a public utility is ignored. It was expressly held that where the consumer
cannot de1nand a product as a matter of right, there can
be no public utility relationship. It is purely contractual.
That is exactly the situation between Salt Lake City and
persons desiring service outside its limits. Without
further discussion we refer the court to the Arizona case
as quoted herein.
As to the case of Atlantic Canst. Co. v. City of Raleigh, supra, counsel simply say that the statutes of North
Carolina gave the city jurisdiction over its sewage system
hoth \Yithin and without the city. And counsel states that
Tou:n of CriJneslG!Jird v. City of Wash., 66 S.E. 2d 794,
is of the same import. The sa1ne explanation is given of
vV a.ter W arks Boa.rd of City of Mobile v. City of Mobile,
supra. Section 10-8-2 of our statute provides that cities
1nay purchase and hold property, real and personal, for
the benefit of 'the city both within and without its corporate boundaries. Section 10-7-14 says that the City may
enact ordinances, rules and regulations for the manageInent and conduct of the water vv-orks system owned or
controlled by it. Section 10-8-22 gives the city the power
to fix the rates to be paid for water furnished by the
city. vVe ask, do not these statutes expressly give the city
jurisdiction of its water works wherever the saine 1nay
be? Doe:-; not Section 10-8-14 expressly give the right
to sell water outside the corporate

limits~

Wherein then
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is the supposed distinction between these two North
Carolina cases and the case at bar~ The fact is there is
none and no attempt is made by counsel to distinguish the
third and latest North Carolina case, Filligham v. Town
of Selma) supra. Other cases -cited by the city are likewise not referred to by plaintiffs.
Curiously enough counsel present not a single decision of the courts of last resort in support of their position. All citations are to Public Service ·Commission rulings. Furthermore, it does not appear from counsel's
quotations that the statutes and constitutional provisions
there involved are at all similar to ours.

POINT FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE DEFENDANT PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH HAS AUTHORITY AND THAT IT IS
ITS DUTY TO REGULATE THE SALE AND DISTRIBUTION
OF WATER WHICH IS DISPOSED OF BY THE DEFENDANT SALT LAKE CITY OUTSIDE OF ITS CORPORATE
LIMITS.

What has heretofore been said herein on the other
points is applicable to Point Four so far as defendant
Salt Lake City is concerned. We feel we have demonstrated that the petition fails to state a claim against
the city upon which relief can be granted. That ends the
matter so far as the city is concerned; and it like\vise
ends the matter so far as all the other defendants are
concerned, including the public service commission. If,
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as \Ve have shown, the city is not subject to the Public
Utilities . ..\.ct in disposing of its surplus water, then defendant Public Service Commission eould not be required
to assu1ne jurisdiction and no relief could be given to
plaintiff as against that defendant.
\Vhether the petition is fatally defective because
plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedy
by a proceeding before the Public Service Commission
before co1nn1encing this action is a question which we will
leave to that defendant to argue.
CONCLUSION
\Ve sub1nit that there is no uncertainty as to the
provisions of either Section 10-8-14 or the Sections of
the Public Utilities Act relied on by plaintiffs. It is also
clear that the City may lawfully dispose of its surplus
"\Vater outside its limits. It may dispose of the same on
a contractual basis without creating any vested interest
therein in anyone contracting to purchase the same. It
may construct such pipelines and facilities as may be
necessary to make delivery of this surplus water. In
the disposition of its surplus water it cannot, by the very
nature of things, stand in the classification of a public
utility; it can only stand in the position of a governmental unit disposing of a surplus as an incident to the furnishing of water to its inhabitants. Since it is not selling water to the public generally, since it may not so
dispose of its surplus water as to give any one a right
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to demand \Vater, and to insist upon a perpetual delivery
of water, it is not subject to the jurisdiction of the Public S-ervice Commission. All this appearing as, a matter
of law from plaintiffs' petition it fails to state facts
which would entitle plaintiffs to any relief and the judgment of dismissal would be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN and
WAYNE CHRISTOFFERSEN
Assistant City Attorneys

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
Salt Lake City
414 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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